Very literate, very frightening stuff about Iraq.

[demiurgent]

There is a man named William S. Lind. He is a German War Historian, a strategist and tactician (of a level that he has taught at Quantico, counts many Marine and other military officers and generals as his confidants -- this guy is the serious goods). He thinks we've committed a series of horrendous errors in Iraq and in the "War on Terror" as a whole.

Now, before you think that Eric's going off in his Liberal ways once more, understand -- Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. You don't get more conservative (and I mean truly, honestly conservative, not "neo-conservative" or anything like it). I doubt Mr. Lind and I would agree on many social issues -- though we'd agree on a surprising number overall -- true conservatism and true liberalism has many core concepts in common. In fact, that degree of common ground is one reason the neo-cons have been able to hijack the Republican Party. But I digress.

Lind is a regular contributor to Defense and the National Interest, a website founded to, in their own words, "foster debate on the roles of the U.S. armed forces in the post-Cold War era and on the resources devoted to them. The ultimate purpose is to help create a more effective national defense against the types of threats we will likely face during the first decades of the new millennium." They are made up of active, reserve and retired military personnel, and they know their subject. And Lind, who worked in Government (most notably for the late Robert Taft, Jr., the late Republican Senator from Ohio), is better versed than most on both the political game and the battlefield game.

Lind is one of the principal architects of so-called Fourth Generation Modern Warfare. I won't go into detail (if you're interested -- and you should be -- you can find more detailed definitions of the four generations of modern warfare here, but in short, the First Generation of modern war dates back to the 17th century, and represents the State taking on a monopoly of war in the Western World following a highly ordered and centralized control. The Second Generation of Warfare dates back to French techniques in the First World War, and comes down to a hierarchically organized war of attrition -- "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." (It is also the source of the 'highly synchronized, highly obedient, low-individual-initiative-commander' military the United States still uses today). The Third Generation, or maneuver warfare, represents fast, mobile military forces a la the Germans in World War II, decentralizing authority on the battlefield in lieu of speed and the concept of the Military objective outweighing the organizational structure. The military becomes focused on the enemy and how to win, rather than how to control its own forces.

Fourth Generation Warfare, which our enemies have entered into in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Africa's current troubles and all over the world, is a return to stateless conflict. Our enemies in Iraq are not one force we're opposing, but many many groups, each fighting their own war. Some hearken back to groups like Al Qaeda, others have nothing to do with those groups. All they have in common is a need to kill us and drive us out, and we're badly losing on that score.

Part of the problem -- in fact, the core of the problem -- harkens back to that moment in every war film and television show where one of our brave, handsome Colonels, in charge on the ground, turns to his local ally and says "who's in charge -- who's their leader? If I could just talk to him for ten minutes, we might be able to end this senseless war." You know the moment.

The problem is, there is no leader we can talk to.

There is no leader we can talk to.

Lind details the problem here.:

What are the implications of [these developments] for America’s attempts to create a stable, democratic Iraq? It is safe to say that they are not favorable. First, it means that the task of re-creating a real, functioning Iraqi state – not just a “government” of Quislings living under American protection in the Green Zone – has gotten more difficult. Fourth Generation war represents a quantum move away from the state, compared to Phase II, where the Baathists were fighting to re-create a state under their domination. The fractioning process will continue and accelerate, creating more and more resistance groups, each with its own agenda. The defeat of one means nothing in terms of the defeat of others. There is no center to strike at, no hinge that collapses the enemy as a whole, and no way to operationalize the conflict. We are forced into a war of attrition against an enemy who outnumbers us and is far better able to take casualties and still continue the fight.

We will also find that we have no enemy we can talk to and nothing to talk about. Since we – but not our enemies – seek closure, that is a great disadvantage. Ending a war, unless it is a war of pure annihilation, means talking to the enemy and reaching some kind of mutually acceptable settlement. When the enemy is not one but a large and growing number of independent elements, talking is pointless because any agreement only ends the war with a single faction. When the enemy’s motivation is not politics but religion, there is also nothing to talk about, unless it is our conversion to Islam. Putting these two together, the result is war without end – or, realistically, an American withdrawal that will also be an American defeat.

This is not a Kerry supporter talking (in fact, he has absolutely no love for Kerry). He is extremely anti-Bush, however, and seems quite convinced that at least with Kerry we can start over... he's not sanguine about what Kerry could do, ironically because Kerry's war strategies are based in neo-conservative models -- but at least it would be a step away from the military failure of Rumsfeld and company to understand the nature of our foe and how to fight it.

Regardless of your political stance, however, you should... you need to read this man's "On War" columns straight through. This man is, at the core, an informed expert on the very type of war we have found ourselves in. I wish with all my heart he or one of his disciples was Defense Secretary. Absent that, we at least need to know his lessons and understand the kind of war we have gotten ourselves into.

Comments

[solaas.livejournal.com]

Very interesting! Thanks for the links and the article, Eric.

[cinnabari.livejournal.com]

Thanks for this.